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Intergroup Solidarity in Peace Activism: The Potential for Success or Backlash

A Dissertation Presented

By

THOMAS C. O'BRIEN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences

Intergroup Solidarity in Peace Activism: The Potential for Success or Backlash

A Dissertation Presented

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ABSTRACT

INTERGROUP SOLIDARITY IN PEACE ACTIVISM: THE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS OR BACKLASH

FEBRUARY 2017

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Integrating theory on distinct modes of social identity (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Eidelson, 2008) with group-based emotion in protracted conflict (Halperin & Pilskin, 2015) and exposure to outgroups (Saguy & Halperin, 2014), this dissertation tests how Jewish Israelis respond when ingroup members and outgroup members work together to advocate for peaceful solutions to conflict (i.e., intergroup solidarity), and how glorification of one's national group moderates these responses. Instructing participants to imagine a peace activist organization, Study 1 shows evidence that glorification of one's ingroup predicts more anger, less hope, and less support for a political solution reflecting compromise. With a student sample, Study 2 shows that learning about an activist organization where both groups work together, relative to an organization where ingroup members work alone, increases support for allowing the organization to present on campus by reducing anger and increasing hope. Manipulating both group composition and the target of criticism, Study 3 shows that glorification becomes less predictive of negative responses to activism when the activist organization consists of only ingroup

members, and when both ingroup members and outgroup members are criticized for their role in the conflict.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Activists trying to end intergroup conflict must elicit public support (Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008), as any sustainable solution to the conflict will rely on it. Understanding the effectiveness of different strategies for eliciting public support is thus critical for activists and, ultimately, any party seeking to end intergroup conflict.

Activists advocating an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict often adopt the strategy of intergroup solidarity, whereby both groups -- Jewish Israelis and Palestinians -- work together to denounce past violence and advocate a permanent political solution that brings peace (see Nasie, Bar-Tal, & Shnaidman; see also Perry, 2011). For example, the group *Combatants for Peace* is an organization of Jewish Israelis and Palestinians who “believe that only through joint action can we (Palestinians and Israelis) break the cycle of violence and put an end to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories” (Combatants for Peace, 2016). This demonstrates a powerful form of indirect contact for members of the public witnessing activism (e.g., Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997); these activists who engage in intergroup solidarity provide an example for other Israelis and Palestinians demonstrating that members of both groups want peace and are willing to work together to achieve it.

Whereas this strategy reflects an intuitive understanding of psychological theory on promoting harmonious relations between groups (see Vezzali, Hewstone, Capozza, Giovannini, & Wölfer, 2014), other psychological perspectives could predict that exposure to such examples of intergroup solidarity would have the opposite effect.

Generally, people want to view ingroups that are important to them in a positive light (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and as moral (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). In arguing for a change in relations between Israelis and Palestinians, activists are defying the traditional norms and authority of the ingroup, and could also imply that the ingroup's policies and actions are, to some extent, to blame for the conflict. Both of these could result in aversive reactions from ingroup members (Schacter, 1951; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Eidelson, 2008), especially if interpreted as forsaking the interests of the ingroup to join an outgroup with whom one's group is in conflict (Travagilino et al., 2014).

Thus, the primary question guiding my dissertation is when intergroup solidarity will elicit public support and when it will elicit backlash. More specifically, the research presented in this dissertation tests whether intergroup solidarity in the context of peace activism may elicit support or backlash relative to activism enacted by only ingroup members or outgroup members, how glorification of the ingroup could moderate whether intergroup solidarity elicits support or backlash, and how the target of activists' criticism determines whether intergroup solidarity elicits support or backlash.

How Indirect Contact and Exposure to Outgroups Can Enhance Intergroup Relations

Research suggests that crossing group boundaries can have positive outcomes for intergroup relations (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Positive, indirect contact with outgroup members – that is, knowledge of ingroup members having positive contact with outgroup members – can promote more positive beliefs about those outgroups and support for behaviors that improve intergroup relations

(Vezzali et al., 2014; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Indirect contact improves intergroup relations in part by promoting more positive beliefs about the norms that guide how the ingroup relates to the outgroup and vice versa (Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008; Wright et al., 1997).

Beyond indirect contact, mere exposure to outgroups expressing views that either promote positive relations with the ingroup (Leshem, Klare, & Flores, 2016; O'Brien, Leidner, & Tropp, in press) or that show the ability to be critical of the ingroup (Saguy & Halperin, 2014) can enhance positive outcomes. Such exposure to outgroups has been shown to have a positive impact even in a context of protracted conflict; for example, Jewish Israelis who watched a video of a Palestinian expressing hope for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to end also expressed more hope for the conflict ending (Leshem et al., 2016). When people living in a context of protracted conflict learned about members of the outgroup with whom they are in conflict critiquing their own group (e.g., Israelis learning about Palestinians criticizing Palestinians), they became more open to learning about the outgroup's perspective (Saguy & Halperin, 2014). Knowledge of ingroup and outgroup members working together as activists to improve intergroup relations could therefore represent a powerful form of exposure demonstrating that members of both groups want peace and can work together toward that goal.

Responses to Intergroup Solidarity: The Role of Ingroup Identification

Still, how people respond to ingroup and outgroup members working together is likely to depend on how they identify with their groups. As the ingroup becomes psychologically important, identification motivates people to view the ingroup in particular ways (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The more strongly people identify with their

groups, the more they see the group as part of their own self-concept (Tropp & Wright, 2001), and the more important it is to view the ingroup in this positive light (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). People also look to their groups to fulfill needs for understanding and navigating the world (Correll & Park, 2005; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & Grada, 2006; Schacter, 1951). These needs become especially felt and thus groups become especially important in contexts of protracted intergroup conflict, as people cling more strongly to their groups as a resource for guiding intergroup relations and behavior (Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012).

One strategy for fulfilling the motivation to view the ingroup in a positive light is blinding ourselves to evidence of the contrary, denying or downplaying the importance of information that conflicts with a positive image of the ingroup (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Eidelson, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). People also want to view the ingroup as cohesive (Correll & Park, 2005; Schachter, 1951). The more important our groups are to us, the more we want to see our ingroups as groups of people similar to one another with common goals (Lickel et al., 2000). When people want to see their ingroups as unified, they reject those who violate group norms (Schachter, 1951), and stronger identification with their groups can lead people to reject deviant group members (Hutchison, Abrams, & de Moura, 2013). Along with enhancing group identification, contexts of protracted conflict are likely to increase the importance of viewing one's ingroup as unified (Bar-Tal et al., 2012).

In conflict settings, by advocating for changes to the nature of intergroup relations and ingroup policies to be more amicable toward an outgroup, ingroup activists are deviating from group norms and authorities, thereby representing divergence among

ingroup members and potentially invoking criticism of how the ingroup handles relations with the outgroup. To the extent that group members seek to avoid negative information about the group and reject ingroup deviance, they should react with backlash to activists rather than supporting their efforts.

How People Identify with the Ingroup Determines the Consequences of Identification

More specifically, whether people welcome or reject both groups working together in solidarity for peace activism to end intergroup conflict may ultimately depend on how they identify with the ingroup. Different ways of identifying with ingroups can have destructive or constructive outcomes for intergroup relations (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Eidelson, 2008). The differentiation between ingroup glorification and attachment (e.g., Roccas et al., 2008) is especially relevant for understanding how people react to intergroup solidarity, because this kind of activism challenges group members' reverence for the ingroup's norms and intergroup behaviors, and could also present a moral challenge to their view of the ingroup.

Glorifiers believe that the ingroup is superior and that its members should defer to ingroup norms, institutions, and leaders (Roccas et al., 2008). Glorifiers meet their need to view the ingroup in a positive light by deploying defense mechanisms to delegitimize any evidence that contradicts the positive image they have of their ingroup. For example, when glorifiers learn about outgroup victims tortured at the hands of ingroup members, they dehumanize those victims and demand less punishment of ingroup perpetrators than when they learn about outgroup victims tortured at the hand of outgroup members (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). Thus, rather than advocating for

changes within the ingroup, glorifiers reject any evidence of the group needing to address immoral behavior.

In contrast to glorification, attachment involves care for and commitment to the ingroup (Roccas et al., 2008). To the extent that people feel attached to, but not inclined to glorify, their ingroup, their motivation to view the ingroup in a positive light does not necessarily blind them to the ingroup's flaws. Rather, acknowledgement of ingroup shortcomings could actually motivate people to address injustices the ingroup has committed (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatin, 2006).

Taken together, these trends suggest that group members will likely show different responses to intergroup solidarity depending on how they identify with their groups. Glorifiers should be sensitive to activism generally, because activists defy the norms and authorities of the ingroup. Moreover, glorifiers should be especially sensitive to activism that takes the form of both groups working together (i.e., intergroup solidarity), as the notion that change is needed could threaten their view of the ingroup as superior.

Backlash or Support?

Research has yet to test how both of these processes – glorification with groups and indirect exposure to other groups – may jointly contribute to predicting group members' responses to intergroup solidarity. In contrast to observing ingroup members or outgroup members working on their own, seeing the groups work together in solidarity for peace to end intergroup conflict could elicit either backlash or support. On the one hand, both groups working together to reduce the conflict could constitute a powerful form of indirect exposure to outgroups demonstrating the potential for more positive

relations between the groups (Saguy & Halperin, 2014; Wright et al., 1997). On the other hand, learning about ingroup members who are working together with outgroup members could conflict with group members' motivations to view their ingroups as unified (e.g., Bar-Tal et al, 2012; Lickel et al., 2000) and could elicit negative reactions reflecting backlash, particularly among those who glorify their groups. Thus, the present research tests whether intergroup activist organizations elicit support versus backlash, whether divergent levels of support vs. backlash to activist organizations of these different group compositions depend upon the extent to which participants glorify their ingroup, and whether the target of the activist organization's criticism (criticizing primarily the ingroup or both groups) moderates divergent responses to organizations of different group compositions.

How Emotions Predict Responses to Intergroup Solidarity: Anger and Hope as Mediators

Moreover, the present research examines how these factors may elicit emotions such as anger and hope, and how these emotions may guide group members' responses to intergroup solidarity. Group-based emotions have particular relevance in settings of protracted intergroup conflict, as they direct people to support group actions that could enhance or reduce the conflict (Halperin & Pilskin, 2015).-When group identity is salient, people who view their ingroup as strong are more prone to feel anger on behalf of their group and express intentions to act aggressively towards outgroups (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Activism to end intergroup conflict should make social identity salient. As they revere deference to ingroup norms and authorities (Roccas et al., 2008), those who strongly glorify the ingroup should be especially likely to react with anger towards

activism supporting a peaceful end to the conflict, as activists are, by definition, challenging deference. The link between anger and glorification is consistent with past research linking anger to group-based provocations among high glorifiers (Steele, Parker, & Lickel, 2015). The link between anger directed at activists and opposition to their goals is consistent with research in the Israeli context showing that anger is related to more negative attitudes towards those advocating peace with Palestinians (perceiving them as less wise and less patriotic), the general goal of resolving conflict with Palestinians, and the specific solutions to achieve it (Kahn, Liberman, Halperin, & Ross, 2016)². If glorifiers react to activists with anger, this may be particularly acute when those activists are engaging in intergroup solidarity, as joining with outgroup members violates ingroup norms and authority to a stronger extent than other forms of activism.

Those who do not strongly glorify the ingroup should instead be less resistant to defiance of ingroup norms and authorities (Roccas et al., 2008). Since they are not bound to viewing the ingroup as superior and revering deference to it, those who do not strongly glorify the ingroup should react with less anger to intergroup solidarity than those who do glorify the ingroup. For those low in glorification, in the absence of anger, intergroup solidarity may result in more hope as it demonstrates a powerful form of positive exposure to outgroups (e.g., Leshem et al., 2016; Saguy & Halperin, 2014).


In contrast to anger, hope entails thinking abstractly beyond what is happening in the present (Bar-Tal, 2001; Isen, 2002; Snyder, 2002; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). Even in a context of protracted conflict, hope for better relations between an ingroup and an outgroup can make people more receptive to learning about the outgroup's perspective (Saguy & Halperin, 2014), and can lead to support for actions that will enhance positive

relations between the ingroup and outgroup (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014). Thus, to the extent that glorification involves deference and viewing the group as superior, lower levels of glorification should be associated with greater hope, and a greater openness to hearing the activists' message, and perhaps even eliciting support for political solutions to the conflict.

Research Goals and Hypotheses

The overarching goal of this dissertation is to examine whether peace activism in the form of intergroup solidarity provokes support or backlash among ingroup members, and the role of glorification of the ingroup in moderating these effects. Below, in Figure 1, I present the overall conceptual model for the series of studies, in which I predict that the extent to which people glorify their ingroup should determine whether intergroup solidarity in peace activism should provoke support or backlash. I propose that those who glorify their ingroup strongly should react more negatively towards activism in general, and particularly towards activism involving intergroup solidarity, because they will feel more anger and less hope in response to learning about members from both groups working together.

Figure 1. Conceptual model: Intergroup solidarity should predict support among those low in glorification, and backlash among those high in glorification.



Activism and Intergroup Solidarity in the Israeli-Palestinian Context

These issues will be examined in the unique context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, this dissertation research will test whether Jewish Israelis show support for or backlash against peace activist organizations that represent intergroup solidarity among Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, relative to their support for organizations that include only Jewish Israelis (ingroup members). The protracted nature of the conflict makes it a salient feature of daily life for people who live in this context (Bar-Tal, 2007; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). The threat of violence, in some form, is always present. Still, there are groups of Israelis and Palestinians who demonstrate, often in solidarity with one another, against policies and actions they see as exacerbating the

conflict (see Nasie et al., 2014; see also Perry, 2011). What follows below is a brief summary of factors that are particularly important for understanding how peace activists are trying to change opinions about the conflict among Jewish Israelis.

The sense of threat and victimhood that influences Jewish Israelis' beliefs about the conflict is about far more than relations between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Vollhardt, 2009; Schori-Eyal, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2014). The founding of the modern state of Israel in 1948 came after centuries of persecution of Jewish people around the world, three years after the surrender of Nazi Germany to Allied powers and the ending of the Holocaust. Scholars have argued that this history enhances a mindset that bleeds into the relationship between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians (e.g., Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a; Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992b).

Israel's relations with the broader Middle East, between the founding of the state and through the 20th century, also enhances a mindset that often provokes defensive attitudes regarding the conflict with Palestinians (e.g., Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a; Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992b). Israel and neighboring Arab states engaged in several wars between the founding of the modern state and the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1978. Most consequential for political solutions posed for the conflict today are the 1948 and 1967 wars. The major implications of the former included (1) the expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in what is now Israel, part of the first stage in creating the Palestinian refugee crisis, and (2) the prevailing of Israel in the face of attacks by neighboring Arab states. The major implications of the six-day war of 1967 include the occupation of the East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, as well as Gaza from Egypt (Cleveland, 2004). Thus, when people refer to a two-state solution defined by the

“1967” lines, it refers to allowing a Palestinian state in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. Whereas both Egypt and Jordan have signed peace treaties with Israel, to some extent, the conflict still involves other players in the Middle East (Kelman, 2007).

Policymakers and activists within Israel – as well as international organizations and foreign governments – have proposed several options as permanent solutions to end the conflict. Some of these solutions reflect a resistance to having the Jewish Israeli ingroup make compromises, such as a one-state solution in which Israel remains a Jewish State (either with some Palestinians still living there, or from which all Palestinians must leave to neighboring Arab states). Other proposed solutions reflect a willingness among Jewish Israelis to compromise, such as a two-state solution that would create an independent Palestine (see Kelman, 2007). For example, the organization *Combatants for Peace*, a joint Israeli and Palestinian activist organization, advocates for a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capitol of the independent Palestine (e.g., Combatants for Peace, 2016). Some also argue for a binational state in which Jewish Israelis and Palestinians would have equal rights, a solution that would greatly empower Palestinians from their current status (see Habib, 2016; see also Rumely & Tibon, 2015).

The Oslo Accords, signed in 1993, were meant to bring about a permanent solution. Whereas the Accords temporarily brought hope, continued violence following the accords brought about skepticism with the peace process (see Perlmutter, 1995; Shikaki, 1998; and Zogby Research Services, 2013). Frustration with the accords’ failure to bring about a permanent solution led to the second Intifada, an uprising far more

violent than the first. Erupting in 2001, the Second Intifada created a wave of violence between Israelis and Palestinians (Sharoni & Abu-Nimer, 2013).

Presently, peace activists have to argue for a change in Israeli policies to a generation that has seen past efforts towards peace fail, who have witnessed suicide bombings, and many of whom may have had family members killed or injured in the conflict. Indeed, the distress and sense of threat that exposure to political violence brings on can generally increase resistance to making compromises in the conflict (Canetti, Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, & Bar-Tal, 2015). Moreover, the memories of violence and the threat of future violence is especially likely to make many people cling to their group identities, making them less willing to accept messages that threaten the positive and unified image of their ingroup (Bar-Tal et al., 2012).

Overview of Research Studies

Informed by the ongoing conflict, this dissertation examines how Jewish Israelis respond to intergroup solidarity for peace between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, by testing how (a) the group composition of activist organizations and (b) how people identify with their ingroup (glorification) impact their support for or backlash against activist organizations seeking to end the conflict. More specifically, with a national sample of Jewish Israelis, Study 1 tested how people would react to an activist organization composed of both ingroup and outgroup members (i.e., intergroup solidarity), as compared to one composed exclusively of ingroup members, or one composed exclusively of outgroup members, and whether participants' levels of glorification moderated their responses to political solutions to the conflict. With a student sample, Study 2 tested how the group composition of activist organizations and

levels of glorification predicted both responses to political solutions to the conflict and students' support for activist organizations on campus to express their views. Returning to a national sample, Study 3 examined more precisely how Jewish Israelis would respond to the group composition of activist organizations depending on whether these organizations were explicitly critical of both groups, or only of the ingroup, and also whether the effects of group composition and target of criticism depended upon levels of glorification.

CHAPTER 2

STUDY 1

Study 1 Introduction

Study 1 sought to test whether an activist organization composed of both ingroup members and outgroup members would elicit higher levels of anger, lower levels of hope, and consequently lower levels of support for political solutions reflecting compromise than an activist organization composed of only ingroup members, or only outgroup members. The main goal of Study 1 was to determine how group composition of the activist organization would affect participants' emotions and support for political solutions depending upon the degree to which they glorified the ingroup. I predicted that those who scored high on glorification would react most negatively (i.e., with higher levels of anger, lower levels of hope, less support for political solutions reflecting compromise and more support for political solutions empowering the ingroup) to an intergroup activist organization, as compared to the other conditions. In contrast, I hypothesized that those who scored low on glorification would react most receptively, by showing less anger, more hope, more support for political solutions reflecting compromise, and less support for political solutions that would give power to the ingroup. To test these hypotheses, I conducted an experiment asking participants to imagine a peace activist organization, assigning them randomly to conditions in which the organization included a combination of ingroup members and outgroup members working together (intergroup solidarity condition), only ingroup members (ingroup condition), or only outgroup members (outgroup condition).

Study 1 Methods

Participants and Procedure

A between-participants experiment with three conditions tested these hypotheses with Jewish Israeli adults recruited through the online service Midgam (<http://www.midgam.com/>).

Participants were asked to imagine one of three peace activist organizations: one in which members of the organization are exclusively Jewish Israeli (ingroup condition), one in which members of the organization are exclusively Palestinian (outgroup condition), and one that includes Jewish Israeli and Palestinian peace activists working together in solidarity (intergroup solidarity condition). Besides descriptions of the group membership of the activist organizations (Jewish Israeli, Palestinian, or both), the text describing the goals and work of each peace activist organization was held constant across conditions.

The English version of the manipulation is below:

We would like for you to imagine a peace activist organization that consists of (Jewish Israelis/Palestinians/Jewish Israelis and Palestinians working together). This group uses non-violent methods to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians. It works with other Israeli organizations using non-violence, but it is not working with any Palestinian organizations, and only Jewish Israelis belong to the organization.

At the end of the study, participants were asked to respond to a multiple choice question regarding the group composition of the peace activist organization about which they read, as an attention check for the experimental manipulation. Of 159 Jewish Israeli adults who completed the study, 31 did not pass the attention check, incorrectly stating the group composition of the activist organization they were asked to imagine, including nine in the ingroup condition, seven in the intergroup condition, and 17 in the outgroup

condition. These exclusions left a total of 126 participants, Including 64 males and 62 females (ages 18-72; $M = 39.61$, $SD = 14.27$). Analyses yielded similar results whether excluding or not excluding the 31 participants who did not accurately respond to the attention check.

Measures

Unless stated otherwise, participants were asked to respond to each of the following items on a 1-9 sliding scale, with higher scores indicating an affirmative response to the question or statement.

Anger and hope in reaction to the activist organization. Participants were asked to respond to a series of adjectives and statements to assess the emotions they felt when thinking about the organization.

Instructions: *In this next set of questions, we would like to ask you about the emotions you feel when thinking about this organization, moving the slider below anywhere between “Not at all” and “Absolutely”. When thinking about this organization, I feel...*

To assess anger in reaction to the organization, participants were asked to respond to the following adjectives adapted from prior research assessing anger (e.g., Halperin, 2011; Mackie et al., 2000): *Angry, Irritated, Annoyed, Irate, and Betrayed* ($\alpha = .97$, $M = 3.21$, $SD = 2.33$).

To assess hope for the future of relations between Palestinians and Israelis in reaction to the organization, participants were asked to respond to two statements adapted from prior research (Saguy & Halperin, 2014) following the direction, *When thinking*

about this organization, I feel...: Hopeful about the future relations between Israelis and Palestinians and Optimistic that the conflict will end ($\alpha = .88$, $M = 3.81$, $SD = 2.26$).

An exploratory principal components analysis with oblique rotation using the five items to assess anger and the two items to assess hope yielded two distinct factors (eigenvalues > 1); this analysis indicated that all five items included to assess anger loaded on one factor (loadings .90-.98) and the two items included to assess hope loaded on the other factor (.83-.85).

Support for political solutions. To test effects of condition on support for political solutions, participants were asked to indicate their support for two different types of peace agreements: a two-state solution (more compromise to the ingroup; $M = 2.62$, $SD = 2.44$), or a one-state solution (less compromise to the ingroup; $M = 4.21$, $SD = 2.74$). See Appendix for full-text of these measures.

Glorification of the ingroup. To assess whether the extent to which participants glorify their ingroup moderates their reactions to peace activist organizations, participants were asked to respond to the scales for glorification and attachment, originally developed for use with Jewish Israelis (Roccas et al., 2006).

Specifically, participants were asked to respond to the eight items assessing glorification from Roccas et al. (2006; $\alpha = .84$, $M = 5.78$, $SD = 1.67$), including four items designed to assess beliefs in ingroup superiority (e.g., *Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation, Israel is better than other nations in all respects*), and four items designed to assess deference to the ingroup, (e.g., *it is disloyal for Israelis to criticize Israel, In today's world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation*). Additionally, to be able to distinguish glorification from feelings of attachment

to the ingroup, participants were asked to respond to the eight items from Roccas et al. (2006) assessing attachment (e.g., *I love Israel; It is important for me to contribute to my nation*; $\alpha = .95$, $M = 7.19$, $SD = 1.87$). Full versions of the measures are available in Appendix.

Although an exploratory factor analysis with oblique rotation initially yielded four factors, analysis of the scree plot indicated that only two were meaningful (the third and fourth were at similar points on the y-axis). Thus, a second analysis was conducted specifying only two factors, which yielded one factor including the eight items assessing glorification (eigenvalue = 7.76; loadings .52-.77) and one factor including the eight items assessing attachment (eigenvalue = 2.06; loadings .57-.95).

Study 1 Results

Hypotheses were tested using the GLM procedure, separately for each dependent variable, entering condition, glorification, and a two-way interaction between glorification and condition as predictors. These analyses tested the hypothesis that condition and glorification would interact, such that high glorifiers would react most negatively to intergroup solidarity, whereas low glorifiers would react most positively to intergroup solidarity. Additionally, these analyses controlled for attachment because, without controlling for attachment, scores on glorification could reflect national identity more broadly, rather than specifically glorification (Roccas et al., 2008) and I sought to test for the unique effects of glorification.

Preliminary analyses using only condition as the independent variable tested whether the experimental manipulation significantly affected scores on glorification (moderator) or attachment (covariate). The tests revealed that the experimental

manipulation of condition did not significantly affect glorification, $F(2, 123) = .10, p = .902$, nor did it affect attachment, $F(2, 123) = .73, p = .485$.

Anger and Hope

Across conditions, higher levels of glorification predicted significantly more anger, $b = .64, SE = .24, t(113) = 2.67, p = .009$, whereas attachment did not predict anger, $b = -.05, SE = .24, t(119) = -.19, p = .853$. Contrary to hypotheses, neither the main effect of condition $F(2, 118) = 1.61, p = .204, \eta^2 = .027$, nor the two-way interaction between glorification and condition, $F(2, 118) = .04, p = .960, \eta^2 = .001$, significantly predicted anger towards the organization.

Across conditions, higher levels of glorification predicted less hope, $b = -.52, SE = .24, t(118) = -2.21, p = .029$, whereas higher levels of attachment predicted more hope, $b = .49, SE = .24, t(118) = 2.07, p = .040$. Yet contrary to hypotheses, neither the two-way interaction, $F(1, 118) = .90, p = .411, \eta^2 = .015$, nor the main effect of condition, $F(2, 118) = 1.40, p = .251, \eta^2 = .023$, predicted hope.

Support for Political Solutions

Analyses also tested the effect of condition, glorification, and the two-way interaction between glorification and condition on support for political solutions. The solution involving more compromise by the ingroup (e.g., two-state solution) was conceptualized as support for the efforts of the activist organization, whereas the solution involving less compromise by the ingroup (e.g., one-state solution) was conceptualized as backlash. Thus, it was predicted that condition and glorification would interact, such that the intergroup solidarity condition would elicit stronger support for a one-state solution and lower support for a two-state solution among high glorifiers.

Support for two-state solution (more compromise by the ingroup). As predicted, across conditions, higher levels of glorification predicted less support for an outgroup-favoring solution to the conflict (i.e., two-state solution), $b = -1.04$, $SE = .24$, $t(119) = -4.30$, $p < .001$, whereas attachment did not predict support, $b = .24$, $SE = .24$, $t(119) = .99$, $p = .323$. Again, and contrary to hypotheses, neither the main effect of condition, $F(2, 119) = .69$, $p = .503$, $\eta^2 = .012$, nor the two-way interaction, $F(1, 119) = .18$, $p = .836$, $\eta^2 = .003$, predicted support for a two-state solution.

Support for one-state solution (less compromise by the ingroup). Glorification predicted significantly more support for a one-state solution, $b = .87$, $SE = .28$, $t(119) = 3.10$, $p = .002$, whereas attachment did not predict support, $b = -.37$, $SE = .28$, $t(119) = -1.32$, $p = .191$. Neither the main effect of condition, $F(2, 119) = .97$, $p = .384$, $\eta^2 = .016$, nor the two-way interaction, $F(2, 119) = .43$, $p = .654$, $\eta^2 = .007$, predicted support for a one-state solution.

Exploratory Analyses

Given that the analyses reported above did not reveal the predicted main or interaction effects for group composition on anger, hope, or support for political solutions, additional exploratory analyses were conducted. It is conceivable that the relatively abstract scenario of imagining a hypothetical organization was not strong enough to elicit reactions reflected in the dependent variables. Thus, additional analyses tested whether there might be some tentative support for this model in two steps. First, within each condition, (partial) correlational analyses tested whether glorification was related to each mediator and outcome, controlling for attachment. Second, (bivariate)

correlational analyses tested whether anger and hope predicted support for political solutions.

Step 1 of Exploratory Analyses: Do glorification differentially predict outcomes in different conditions?

Table 1 shows partial correlations between glorification and the mediators and outcomes, and between attachment and the mediators and outcomes. Whereas the focus of these analyses is on the correlates of glorification independent of attachment, relationships with attachment are also presented to show that these dimensions of identification function differently. As Table 1 shows, among participants in the intergroup solidarity condition, glorification predicted marginally higher levels of anger. Glorification did not significantly predict hope. Glorification predicted less support for a two-state solution, and more support for a one-state solution. Among participants in the ingroup only condition, glorification predicted neither anger or hope. Higher levels of glorification marginally predicted less support for a two-state solution, and showed a trend toward predicting support for a two-state solution. As shown in the bottom of Table 1, among participants in the outgroup only condition, glorification predicted marginally more anger and significantly less hope. Glorification predicted less support for a two-state solution and a trend toward more support for a one-state solution.

Table 1. Study 1 Partial correlations of glorification and attachment with mediators and outcomes in each experimental condition.

| | <i>Anger</i> | <i>Hope</i> | <i>Support for two- state solution</i> | <i>Support for one- state solution</i> |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|--|--|
| <i>Intergroup Condition</i> | | | | |
| <i>Glorification partial r</i> | .27 | -.05 | -.31 | .40 |
| <i>p</i> | .073 | .730 | .040 | .007 |
| <i>Attachment partial r</i> | -.01 | .18 | -.09 | -.20 |
| <i>p</i> | .971 | .250 | .570 | .203 |
| <i>Ingroup Condition</i> | | | | |
| <i>Glorification partial r</i> | .15 | -.17 | -.27 | .22 |
| <i>p</i> | .342 | .257 | .077 | .150 |
| <i>Attachment partial r</i> | .013 | .13 | .13 | -.09 |
| <i>p</i> | .936 | .399 | .399 | .552 |
| <i>Outgroup Condition</i> | | | | |
| <i>Glorification partial r</i> | .32 | -.42 | -.60 | .19 |
| <i>p</i> | .069 | .014 | <.001 | .286 |
| <i>Attachment partial r</i> | -.07 | .32 | .32 | -.06 |
| <i>p</i> | .693 | .067 | .070 | .748 |

Partial correlations (glorification controlling for attachment, attachment controlling for glorification) are presented in the first row, with *p* values in the second row.

Step 2 of exploratory analyses: Do hypothesized mediators predict the outcomes?

Although the group composition condition did not significantly predict either the mediators or outcomes, links between the hypothesized mediators (anger and hope) and dependent variables (support for political solutions) were tested on an exploratory basis through bivariate correlations. In line with predictions, anger was associated with less support for a two-state solution, $r = -.33$, $p < .001$, and more support for a one-state solution, $r = .23$, $p = .011$. In contrast, hope was associated with more support for a two-

state solution, $r = .47, p < .001$, and it did not significantly correlate with support for a one-state solution, $r = -.07, p = .448$.

Study 1 Discussion

Study 1 examined whether glorification would predict hope and anger towards peace activism, as well as support for political solutions reflecting compromise, depending upon whether the peace activist organizations included both ingroup members and outgroup members working together in solidarity, or only ingroup members or outgroup members. It was predicted that glorification would positively predict anger and support for a political solution that involved the least compromise to the ingroup, and negatively predict hope and support for a political solution reflecting more compromise, and that these relationships would be strongest in reference to activist organizations of both groups working together. Contrary to predictions, analyses did not show that the manipulation of group composition, nor the interaction between condition and glorification predicted anger, hope, or support for political solutions to the conflict. It is possible that these null effects for condition may have been due to the abstract nature of the task: imagining a hypothetical peace activist organization with ingroup members and outgroup members working together, or just ingroup members or outgroup members, may not have been concrete enough to yield significant effects on emotions or political solutions to an ongoing conflict.

The clearest result from Study 1 is that higher scores on glorification predicted outcomes reflecting backlash: more anger, less hope, less support for a political solution reflecting political compromise, and more support for a political solution suggesting less compromise by the ingroup. Additionally, exploratory analyses indicated some support

for the notion that glorification would predict greater anger in reaction to intergroup solidarity, but not in reaction to activists solely from the ingroup. As such, these supplementary analyses are consistent with the hypothesis that those who strongly glorify their ingroup will be especially likely to react negatively to intergroup solidarity. Together, these findings suggest that activism representing both groups working together (intergroup solidarity) may be more likely to provoke negative responses among those who strongly glorify the ingroup, whereas glorification may play less of a role in how people feel towards activist organizations that include only ingroup members.

CHAPTER 3

STUDY 2

Study 2 Introduction

Given concerns that the experimental manipulation in Study 1 was too abstract, Study 2 was designed using a more concrete manipulation of group composition. Study 2 used a student sample to contextualize the activist organization around a campus setting, framing the organization as a campus student group. The primary goal of Study 2 was to test how the group composition of the activist organization impacted support for its efforts, while examining anger and hope as mediators for these effects. I had predicted that an intergroup activist organization would elicit more anger and less hope than an ingroup activist organization, and by doing so, less support for the organization and its activities on campus.

In contrast to measures of support for political solutions, these outcomes are directly tied to participants' support for the organization itself, and are not confounded with strongly held prior beliefs regarding the conflict or political solutions to the conflict. Political attitudes about the conflict are hard to change (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Even if people are open to activism to resolve the conflict and are even inclined to support their ingroup making significant compromises for peace, they still likely disagree on what the most sustainable permanent solution to the conflict is. By adjusting outcome measures from Study 1 to be in direct connection to the activist organization, the measure of hope in Study 2 reflected hope regarding the activities of the organization, rather than appraisals of hope for future relations (e.g., as in Saguy & Halperin, 2014). The survey still measured support for specific political solutions as in Study 1, but the focus of

outcomes switched to support for the organizations to speak on campus and agreement with a critique of the organizations, to more directly connect participants' responses to their support for activism. Additionally, Study 2 included a measure of support for negotiations with Palestinians, to examine whether participants' inclinations towards negotiating might shift as a result of the experimental manipulation.

Study 2 Method

Participants and Procedure

Seventy-two participants were recruited for the study from a private university in Israel. Data from 11 participants were excluded either for not indicating whether they were an Israeli citizen or indicating that they were not an Israeli citizen. Data from another four participants were excluded for indicating a religion other than Judaism, and data from another two participants were excluded because they indicated participating in peace demonstrations more than "seldom".

Participants were recruited via the School of Psychology's experimental participation system in return for course credit. The online advertisement informed participants that the study was about "Learning about political organizations". Upon consenting to the study, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Participants were told about a specific (fictitious) campus organization that either included Jewish Israelis and Palestinians working together (namely, *Israelis and Palestinians Working for a Solution*; intergroup solidarity condition), or only Jewish Israelis (namely, *Israelis Working for a Solution*; ingroup condition). In both conditions, participants read that the organization aimed to promote a non-violent political solution to the conflict to which both Israelis and Palestinians could agree. Also in both conditions,

participants read that the organization was recently critiqued as “dangerous for its naïve perceptions and misguided agenda.” This information was included to allow for a range of participant responses to be deemed acceptable (e.g., from support to rejection of activism) and to set the context for a dependent variable assessing participants’ agreement with criticism of the organization. The full English version of the text is presented below:

The organization, (Israelis Working for a Solution/Israelis and Palestinians Working for a Solution) is a (Jewish-Israeli/joint Jewish Israeli and Palestinian) non-profit composed completely of (Jewish-Israeli/Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian) volunteers. The organization was founded in 1995 with the goal of promoting public support for a non-violent political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that will be acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians. The organization often holds rallies in support of political negotiations and in opposition to policies and actions they see as exacerbating the conflict, including on university campuses. This past week, the organization was harshly criticized in an op-ed as “dangerous for its naïve perceptions and misguided agenda.”

Following the manipulation, all participants were presented with a scenario in which a student wing of the organization indicated that it would like to speak at the university. Specifically, participants read that the organization has a student wing at their university that wishes to invite students and faculty to learn about the organization and its goals, and that the university will decide whether to schedule this event based upon students’ support or opposition. The English version of the text is below.

[Israelis and Palestinians Working for a Solution – or – Israelis Working for a Solution] has a student wing at the (name of school). They want to invite students and faculty to hear about the organization and its goals at the Social Services Center.

The center will decide whether to schedule this or not based on students’ support or opposition.

How much would you support scheduling this organization to present at the Social Services Center?

An attention check administered at the end of the study indicated that many participants did not correctly indicate the group composition of the organization they read about. Seven participants did not correctly indicate the group composition in the intergroup condition (with five indicating that no specific organization was specified, one not answering the question, and one indicating that only Jewish Israelis were in the organization) and ten participants did not correctly indicate the group composition in the ingroup condition. Within each condition, analyses using the GLM procedure were conducted to test whether participants' scores on outcome measures varied significantly depending on whether they did or did not pass the attention check. No significant differences and only two marginal effects were observed (see Table 2). Thus, the attention check was regarded as a general check of participants' retention of the information regarding group composition, rather than as a criterion for exclusion; notes have been added to specify when different results emerge when those who did not accurately respond to the manipulation check are excluded. Altogether, a total of 55 participants, 28 in the intergroup solidarity condition and 27 in the ingroup condition (ages 19-35, $M = 23.04$, $SD = 2.28$; 16 men and 39 women) were included in data analysis.¹

¹ Initially, the design for this study included two additional conditions: a 'baseline' condition where no specific organization was specified, and an 'outgroup only' condition that included only outgroup members. In hindsight, both of these conditions were likely confusing to participants and were therefore dropped from the study design.

First, although the baseline condition did not mention a specific organization in the manipulation, the scenario describing a student wing of "one of these organizations" on campus implied an actual organization; thus, participants were left to guess the group composition of that organization. Second, although the college has Palestinian students who are citizens of Israel, they make up a very small proportion of the total student body, thereby reducing the believability of this manipulation.

Table 2. Differences between participants who passed vs. did not pass attention check in Study 2.

| | | Passed Attention Check <i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>) | Did not pass attention check <i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>) | <i>t</i> |
|-------------------------|--|--|---|---------------------------|
| Intergroup condition | Anger towards the organization | 2.84 (1.66) | 1.92 (.82) | $t(24) = 1.20, p = .242$ |
| | Hope towards the organization | 5.04 (2.30) | 5.78 (2.98) | $t(24) = -.62, p = .543$ |
| | Support for the organization to present on campus | 5.87 (1.53) | 6.36 (.76) | $t(24) = -.62, p = .543$ |
| | Agreement with critique of the organization | 4.56 (1.64) | 4.50 (2.08) | $t(21) = .06, p = .950$ |
| | Support for negotiations with Palestinians | 5.86 (1.90) | 6.19 (3.57) | $t(22) = -.27, p = .789$ |
| | Support for a one-state solution with Palestinian enclaves | 3.81 (1.90) | 2.37 (2.73) | $t(20) = 1.39, p = .178$ |
| | Support for a one-state solution expelling Arabs | 6.71 (5.83) | 6.67 (3.05) | $t(24) = .03, p = .975$ |
| | Support for a two-state solution | 3.61 (1.91) | 2.68 (3.02) | $t(23) = .87, p = .395$ |
| | Anger towards the organization | 3.69 (2.38) | 3.87 (1.86) | $t(25) = -.21, p = .837$ |
| | Hope towards the organization | 3.53 (1.88) | 3.62 (1.32) | $t(24) = -.14, p = .889$ |
| Ingroup condition | Support for the organization to present on campus | 4.64 (2.28) | 4.89 (1.82) | $t(24) = -.29, p = .773$ |
| | Agreement with critique of the organization | 5.90 (2.20) | 4.54 (1.48) | $t(23) = 1.71, p = .1008$ |
| | Support for negotiations with Palestinians | 5.12 (2.30) | 4.98 (1.80) | $t(24) = .17, p = .870$ |

| | | | |
|--|----------------|----------------|--------------------------|
| Support for a one-state solution with Palestinian enclaves | 3.46 (2.34) | 4.02 (2.07) | $t(24) = -.62, p = .542$ |
| Support for a one-state solution expelling Arabs | 5.95 (2.90) | 6.13 (2.51) | $t(24) = -.17, p = .869$ |
| Support for a two-state solution | 3.92 (2.69) | 2.29 (1.37) | $t(24) = 1.77, p = .089$ |

Measures

Following the manipulation and presentation of the scenario with the student wing requesting to speak on campus, three sets of measures were used to assess outcomes, concerning participants' emotional responses of anger and hope, support for the organization, and policy support. Unless otherwise specified, all scales in the survey ranged from 1 ("Strongly oppose" or "Strongly disagree") to 9 ("Strongly support" or "Strongly agree"), with two decimal places in between.

Glorification ($M = 5.03, SD = 1.18, \alpha = .88$) and *attachment* ($M = 5.74, SD = 1.22, \alpha = .88$). Glorification and attachment were assessed through pre-screening measures taken at the beginning of the semester, using shortened four-item versions of the scales used in Study 1, scored on a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). In an oblique rotation specifying two factors, the items for attachment (loadings .62-.97, eigenvalue = 4.32) formed a separate scale from the items for glorification (loadings .71-.86, eigenvalue = .97).

Anger and hope. To assess differences in *anger* and *hope* in response to the organization, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt 12 different emotions in randomized order, which were scored on a scale ranging from "Not at all" (1) and "Absolutely" (9). Anger ($M = 3.22, SD = 1.96, \alpha = .96$) was measured with the same

emotion items as in Study 1. The measure of hope ($M = 4.37$, $SD = 2.20$) was changed from Study 1 and measured with the single item *hopeful*. in order to better reflect an emotional state rather than more general views of the conflict.²

Support for the student organization. Two measures assessed participants' support for the student wing of the organization, to provide a more concrete basis for participants' responses. Single-item measures asked participants how much they supported having the organization speak on campus and how much they agreed with the critique of the organization. First, participants were asked to indicate their support or opposition to the student wing of the organization presenting on campus ($M = 5.31$, $SD = 1.89$), on a scale ranging from "Strongly oppose" (1) and "Strongly Support" (9). Second, participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with the critique of the organization as "dangerous for its naïve perceptions and misguided agenda" ($M = 4.97$, $SD = 1.89$), on a scoring scale ranging from 1 ("Strongly disagree") to 9 ("Strongly agree").

Support for political solutions. As in Study 1, Study 2 included measures assessing support for a one-state solution with Palestinian enclaves ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 2.15$), and support for a two-state solution ($M = 3.36$, $SD = 2.24$). In addition, Study 2 included a more general measure of support for negotiations with Palestinians ($M = 5.47$, $SD = 2.14$). For the negotiations measure, participants indicated on a 9-point scale the extent to which they would describe themselves as a "Hawk" vs. "Dove" regarding support for negotiations between the Israeli government and Palestinians, with lower scores indicating more hawkishness and resistance to negotiations, and higher scores

² One additional item intended to assess hope, *despair* (reverse-scored) was excluded from analyses because it did not correlate strongly with the 'hopeful' item."

indicating more dovishness and support for negotiations. Although attitudes towards the conflict are hard to change (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011), situational factors can affect support for negotiations (Kteily, Saguy, Sidanius, & Taylor, 2013). This general measure of support for negotiations was added because it indicates openness to improving future relations, whereas support for specific political solutions might have more to do with participants' prior political opinions, or their views about what may be realistic or sustainable.

Study 2 Results

Analyses using the GLM procedure and controlling for attachment, tested how condition, glorification, and the interaction between condition and glorification predicted all mediators and outcomes.³

Anger and Hope

Participants in the intergroup solidarity condition ($M = 2.66$, $SD = 1.56$) reported significantly lower anger relative to those in the ingroup condition ($M = 3.76$, $SD = 2.17$), $F(1, 49) = 4.82$, $p = .033$, $\eta_p^2 = .091$. Glorification predicted significantly higher levels of anger, $b = .76$, $SE = .29$, $t(48) = 2.64$, $p = .011$, whereas attachment did not predict anger, $b = .23$, $SE = .30$, $t(48) = .77$, $p = .448$. The interaction between condition and glorification was not significant, $F(1, 48) = .07$, $.794$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$.

³Since the sample was heavily female, and one condition had a disproportionately high number of females relative to the other condition, logistic regression tested whether this imbalance was statistically significant. Analyses indicated that there were significantly fewer males in the intergroup solidarity condition (2) than in the ingroup condition (10), $b = 1.59$, $SE = .66$, Wald Chi-Square = 5.57, $p = .018$. Thus, to limit the extent to which gender presented a confound analyzing differences between conditions, an initial set of analyses was conducted with gender as a covariate in all analyses, as well as the interaction between condition and gender (see Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2003). Since neither gender nor the interaction between gender and condition explained significant variance in any outcome (with the exception of two marginal interactions predicting support for negotiations and interest in joining the organization, $p \geq .09$), gender and the interaction between gender and condition were not included as predictors in the main analyses.

At the same time, participants in the intergroup solidarity condition ($M = 5.18$, $SD = 2.40$) reported significantly greater hope relative to those in the ingroup condition ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.66$), $F(1, 48) = 8.81$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .158$. Neither glorification, $b = .47$, $SE = .35$, $t(48) = 1.34$, $p = .186$ nor attachment significantly predicted hope, $b = -.41$, $SE = .36$, $t(48) = -1.13$, $p = .265$. Additionally, the interaction between condition and glorification was not significant, $F(1, 48) = .50$, $p = .483$, $\eta_p^2 = .011$.

Support for the Organization

Contrary to expectations, participants in the intergroup condition ($M = 5.93$, $SD = 1.45$) showed greater support for the organization to speak on campus relative to participants in the ingroup condition ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 2.08$), $F(1, 45) = 5.00$, $p = .030$, $\eta_p^2 = .100$. Neither glorification, $b = -.56$, $SE = .35$, $t(45) = -1.60$, $p = .116$, nor attachment $b = -.17$, $SE = .35$, $t(48) = -.47$, $p = .642$, significantly predicted support. The interaction between condition and glorification was not significant, $F(1, 45) = .08$, $p = .777$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$. Additionally, there was a non-significant trend for participants in the intergroup condition ($M = 4.55$, $SD = 1.67$) to report less agreement with the critique relative to those the ingroup condition ($M = 5.36$, $SD = 2.03$), $F(1, 43) = 2.16$, $p = .149$, $\eta_p^2 = .048$; no other main or interaction effects were significant.

Support for Political Solutions

There was a trend for those in the intergroup solidarity condition ($M = 5.91$, $SD = 2.16$) to express more identification as a “dove”, supporting negotiations with Palestinians, relative to the ingroup condition ($M = 5.06$, $SD = 2.08$), $F(1, 46) = 2.11$, $p = .153$, $\eta_p^2 = .045$. Glorification did not significantly predict identification as a “dove”, $b =$

-.12, $SE = .36$, $t(48) = -.33$, $p = .742$, nor did the interaction between glorification and condition, $F(4, 45) = 1.91$, $p = .173$, $\eta_p^2 = .041$.

The experimental manipulation did not significantly affect participants' support for any of the political solutions. Neither condition, $F(4, 46) = .06$, $p = .805$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$, nor glorification, $b = -.03$, $SE = .38$, $t(46) = -.08$, $p = .934$, nor the interaction between condition and glorification, $F(4, 46) = .00$, $p = .978$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$ significantly predicted support for a one-state solution. Similarly, neither condition, $F(4, 46) = .06$, $p = .813$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$, nor glorification, $b = .11$, $SE = .40$, $t(48) = .27$, $p = .789$, nor the interaction between condition and glorification, $F(4, 46) = .14$, $p = .712$, $\eta_p^2 = .003$, significantly predicted support for a two-state solution.

Mediation Analyses

Analyses of the condition effects above suggested that participants in Study 2 reacted somewhat more receptively to an intergroup rather than ingroup-only activist organization in the university context; they reported feeling less anger, more hope, and were more supportive of allowing it to speak on campus. Mediation analyses tested whether the intergroup condition, as contrasted to the ingroup condition, affected support for the organization speaking on campus indirectly via its effects on anger and hope. All analyses controlled for glorification, attachment, and the interaction between glorification and condition. I used Hayes' Process (2013) Model 4 with 5,000 bootstrapping samples for each analysis, using a dummy variable representing the condition (with a value of '0' for those in the ingroup condition and a value of '1' for those in the intergroup condition).

Predicting support for the organization speaking on campus. The intergroup condition increased support for allowing the organization on campus indirectly via (reduction in) anger and (increase in) hope as mediators was significant, $b = .39$, $boot\ SE = .26$, [LLCI: .0454, ULCI: 1.1299], and $b = .40$, $boot\ SE = .25$, [LLCI: .10688, ULCI: 1.0787], respectively. The total effect was significant, $b = .79$, $boot\ SE = .34$, [LLCI: .2480, ULCI: 1.6006]. The direct effect was not significant once the mediators were taken into account, $b = .19$, $boot\ SE = .46$, $p = .41$, $p = .687$.

Exploratory Analyses

As in Study 1, additional exploratory analyses tested whether glorification (controlling for attachment) would correlate with the mediators and outcomes differentially when participants in the intergroup condition and the ingroup condition are treated as separate samples. Table 4 presents partial correlations between glorifications (partialling out attachment) and mediators and outcomes, and between attachment (partialling out glorification) and mediators and outcomes. Although correlates of glorification are the focus of analyses, correlates of attachment are reported to show how glorification is related to mediators and outcomes differently from attachment. As Table 3 shows, among participants in the intergroup condition, glorification significantly predicted more anger and less support for having the organization present at the university, and marginally less support for a two-state solution (which would involve compromise by the ingroup). There was also a trend for glorification to predict stronger agreement with the criticism of the organization. In contrast, among participants in the ingroup condition, glorification was not significantly related to any of the mediators or outcomes.

Table 3. Study 2 Partial correlations of glorification with mediators and outcomes in each experimental condition.

| | <i>Anger</i> | <i>Hope</i> | <i>Presenting</i> | <i>Criticism</i> | <i>Negotiations</i> | <i>Two-state</i> | <i>One-state</i> |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <i>Intergroup Condition</i> | | | | | | | |
| <i>Glorification partial r</i> | .58 | -.11 | -.60 | .38 | -.37 | -.43 | -.18 |
| <i>p</i> | .010 | .663 | .007 | .104 | .121 | .067 | .454 |
| <i>Attachment partial r</i> | -.29 | .16 | .48 | -.14 | .28 | .46 | -.05 |
| <i>p</i> | .235 | .523 | .037 | .562 | .249 | .047 | .853 |
| <i>Ingroup Condition</i> | | | | | | | |
| <i>Glorification partial r</i> | .34 | .07 | -.22 | -.05 | -.27 | .06 | -.09 |
| <i>p</i> | .118 | .749 | .321 | .827 | .224 | .798 | .706 |
| <i>Attachment partial r</i> | .18 | -.47 | -.23 | .32 | -.22 | -.53 | .01 |
| <i>p</i> | .423 | .026 | .296 | .153 | .325 | .012 | .975 |

Partial correlations (glorification controlling for attachment, attachment controlling for glorification) are presented in the first row, with *p* values in the second row.

Also as in Study 1, bivariate correlations examined relations between the mediators (anger and hope) and outcomes. As shown in Table 4, anger was significantly associated with less support for having the organization present at the university, more agreement with criticism of the organization, and less support for negotiations with Palestinians (i.e., identification as ‘dove’). In contrast, hope positively predicted more support for having the organization present at the university, more support for negotiations with Palestinians, and more support for a two-state solution.

Table 4. Study 2 Bivariate correlations of anger and hope with outcomes across conditions.

| | <i>Support for presenting</i> | <i>Criticism</i> | <i>Negotiations</i> | <i>Two- state</i> | <i>One- state</i> |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Anger bivariate r</i> | -.56 | .45 | -.41 | -.15 | .21 |
| <i>p</i> | <.001 | .001 | .003 | .308 | .135 |
| <i>Hope bivariate r</i> | .47 | -.22 | .41 | .34 | -.21 |
| <i>p</i> | <.001 | .142 | .003 | .015 | .142 |

Study 2 Discussion

Study 2 tested how an activist organization composed of ingroup members and outgroup members working together, as compared to an activist organization composed of only ingroup members, would predict emotions, support for the organization, and support for political solutions, and whether glorification with the ingroup might moderate the effects. In Study 2, participants were most receptive towards the intergroup, rather than the ingroup-only, activist organization. The effects of the intergroup condition on support for allowing the organization to present on campus was explained via decrease in anger and an increase in hope.

Although there were not significant interaction effects involving glorification, supplemental exploratory analyses indicated that glorification was positively related to anger, and negatively related to outcomes reflecting support for the organization among participants in the intergroup condition. These tentative findings converge with those

obtained in Study 1, suggesting that higher levels of glorification may lead people to respond with backlash rather than support to activist organizations representing intergroup solidarity. A limitation of this study is that such effects for glorification were not observed in the GLM analyses testing its interaction with condition; this may have been due to the low power of the sample, which could not be controlled given challenges in recruiting students in the private university setting. For this reason, Study 3 again used a survey company to collect participants from a national sample.

Together, findings from the first two studies suggest that representations of intergroup solidarity may build support for peace activist organizations (Study 2), yet (tentatively) higher levels of glorification may instead lead to backlash against activist organizations that enact intergroup solidarity (Studies 1 and 2). Although I encountered challenges in recruiting undergraduate participants from a private Israeli university in Study 2, findings from Study 2 are nonetheless informative, in that they show that the group composition of activist organizations can affect Jewish Israelis' responses to their efforts, while underlining the importance of testing their effects as moderated by glorification.

This main effect of condition in Study 2 was not expected, whereby the intergroup organization decreased anger, and increased hope and support for allowing the organization to present on campus. Rather than presuming that intergroup solidarity itself led to this main effect, a second factor may have played a role in relation to both intergroup solidarity and glorification. As noted earlier in this dissertation, people who score high in glorification are especially likely to be sensitive to activism in the form of intergroup solidarity, because this solidarity may threaten their views of the ingroup as

superior and suggest that the ingroup may need to address its own immoral behavior (Roccas et al., 2006; Roccas et al., 2008). Implicit in this analysis is the possibility that people high in glorification are sensitive to criticism of the ingroup. Whereas past research has shown that those who strongly glorify the ingroup are sensitive to information that threatens the moral image of their ingroup (Leidner et al., 2010), it has not been directly tested how they may be sensitive to direct criticism of the ingroup.

Studies 1-2 did not directly manipulate whether the activist organizations were critical of the ingroup, yet it is possible that perceived criticism of the ingroup may have influenced participants' responses. In particular, Israeli activists advocating for change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are advocating either directly for changes to their government's policies or for more awareness regarding the consequences of those policies (see Naise et al., 2014; Perry, 2011). It would have been plausible for participants to presume that the intergroup organization would have been critical of both groups. Indeed, at least one of the most prominent activist organizations in this context that include Israelis and Palestinians working together is critical of violence on either side (e.g., Combatants for Peace; see Perry, 2011); in contrast, an Israeli-only activist organization tends to center its critique on its own ingroup (e.g., Breaking the Silence). In a context of intergroup conflict, learning about a member of the outgroup criticizing their own group can increase hope about the conflict ending and, in so doing, openness to hearing their perspective (Saguy & Halperin, 2014).

Although people are generally less sensitive to members of their ingroup who critique the ingroup than to members of the outgroup who do so (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2002), in contexts of intergroup conflict, the extra allowance for ingroup members to

criticize the ingroup disappears (Ariyanto et al., 2012). If the intergroup condition elicited support with the presumption that this intergroup organization was critical of both groups, it would add to past research on forms of indirect exposure and group-based criticism (Ariyanto et al., 2012; Saguy & Halperin, 2014), by showing that outgroup members joining with ingroup members to criticize both together may buffer the negative impact of the ingroup receiving criticism.

Presuming that the intergroup organization was critical of just the ingroup could also have divergent consequences. If participants did not presume that the intergroup organization was critical of both groups, and presumed instead that it was critical of just the ingroup, the intergroup organization may have elicited backlash; not only would ingroup members be criticizing the ingroup, but they would be joining members of the outgroup to do it. If support for the intergroup activist organization is indeed due to participants' presumption that the intergroup organization is critical of both groups, this would help explain why some effects observed in the previous studies (e.g., agreement with the critique, support for negotiations) were less clear and only emerged as trends.

Manipulating both the group composition of the activist organization and the target of its criticism allows for a more direct test of how intergroup solidarity may induce support for or backlash to peace activism depending upon who is (are) perceived to be the target(s) of criticism, and how glorification moderates these effects. Put another way, the way in which glorification predicts support for activist organizations may depend both on the group composition and the target of criticism. Study 3 was designed to test these possibilities.

CHAPTER 4

STUDY 3

Study 3 Introduction

Study 3 was designed to build on the findings of Study 2 by directly testing how group composition of the activist organization (both ingroup members and outgroup members vs. ingroup members only) leads to support or backlash for the organization depending upon the perceived target of its criticism (both ingroup and outgroup, or ingroup only), and whether or how glorification further moderates these effects (three-way interaction). I expected that the intergroup composition should elicit higher levels of support when the activist organization is critical of both groups, and that it should elicit the most backlash when it is critical of only the ingroup. Moreover, I expected that glorification should generally predict more backlash toward the activist organization, and particularly when both groups are working together in solidarity and when only the ingroup is the target of criticism.

Additionally, Study 3, like Study 1, employed a national sample. Using a national sample enabled more participants to be recruited, to ensure that there would be acceptable statistical power for testing hypotheses. In particular, the larger sample allowed for testing whether participants' glorification of Israel would moderate how either the group composition or target of criticism, or interaction between the two conditions (e.g., three-way interaction) would affect emotions and support for activism and political solutions, and whether the hypothesized indirect effects of the interacting conditions (via anger and hope) depended on glorification (e.g., moderated mediation with two moderators of the indirect effect). I expected that those who strongly glorify the ingroup should be

particularly sensitive to criticism when the ingroup is the only target of criticism, and should also react negatively to instances of intergroup solidarity, whereby the ingroup is working with the outgroup. In contrast, low glorifiers should be relatively less sensitive to having the ingroup be the only target of criticism, and may respond more positively to instances of intergroup solidarity when the ingroup and outgroup are working together. However, both low and high glorifiers still would likely react aversely to both groups working together when the target of their criticism remains exclusively the ingroup.

Study 3 Method

Participants and Procedure

Based on a power analysis⁴ for a two-factor study examining fixed effects and interactions and expecting medium effect sizes, 301 Jewish Israeli participants were recruited to participate in Study 3 via the online company Midgam (<https://www.midgampanel.com>). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions reading about activist organizations, differing according to two factors: the group composition and target of criticism. Each factor had two levels within a 2 (group composition: intergroup solidarity vs. ingroup only) x 2 (target of criticism: both ingroup and outgroup members vs. only ingroup members) factorial design.

Upon consenting to the study, participants were presented with one of four texts that varied along two factors: (1) whether it described an organization called “Israelis and Palestinians Working for a Solution” (intergroup solidarity condition) or whether it described an organization called “Israelis Working for a Solution” (ingroup only

⁴ The program GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to conduct the power analysis with an ANOVA with four groups, main effects, and an interaction, expecting slightly smaller than medium effect sizes.

condition); and (2) whether the organization was reported to be critical of “Israeli and Palestinian policies and actions they see as exacerbating the conflict” (criticism towards both ingroup and outgroup) or of “Israeli policies and actions they see as exacerbating the conflict” (e.g., criticism towards the ingroup only). These procedures allowed group composition to be manipulated in the same way as was done for Study 2, while also adding the factor of target of criticism. Moreover, like Study 2, across conditions the text in Study 3 read “The organization was founded in 1995 with the goal of stopping such policies and actions, and promoting public support for a non-violent political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that will be acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians. They hold rallies to oppose these policies and actions, and to support political negotiations.”

Rather than presenting an organization with a student wing on campus as in Study 2, Study 3 presented participants with an organization intending to organize events in areas of Israel near the participants; participants were further informed that local governments will use the survey as a poll of public opinion showing support or opposition to the organization using public spaces for this purpose. The English version of the text of this scenario is provided below.

[Israelis and Palestinians Working for a Solution – or – Israelis Working for a Solution] wants to organize events to discuss the conflict and potential solutions at public venues across all of Israel, including public libraries, universities, and parks.

Local governments are deciding whether to allow *[Israelis and Palestinians Working for a Solution – or – Israelis Working for a Solution]* to organize for this purpose. Since a representative sample of Israel’s population is taking this survey, local governments are using the opinions of Israelis in each locality taking this survey to decide whether to allow the organization to present in public venues.

Of the participants recruited for this study, one participant was excluded based on their identification as Christian, and another eight were excluded because they indicated that they had participated in demonstrations to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians more than “seldom”. In an effort to omit careless responses that are common in online data collection (see Curran, 2016) another 60 participants were excluded for failing an attention check at the end of the study asking about the group composition of the activist organization. These included 20 participants in the intergroup condition (5 where both groups were targets of criticism, 15 where only the ingroup was the target of criticism) and 40 participants in the ingroup only condition (18 where both groups were targets of criticism and 22 where only the ingroup was the target of criticism), leaving a total of 232 participants for data analysis (109 men and 123 women; ages 18-64, $M = 39.28$ years, $SD = 13.18$).⁵

As in Studies 1-2, the attention check was located at the end of the study. Although I had considered moving the attention check earlier, soon after the experimental manipulations, I decided to keep it at the end of the survey out of concern that asking specific questions about group composition directly after the manipulation would prompt participants’ suspicions regarding the study’s purpose. However, in addition to the multiple-choice attention checks, a continuous measure of participants’ perceptions of

⁵ There were no significant differences across any of the conditions between those excluded and not excluded for the group composition attention check on the outcomes of anger, hope, support for the organization presenting, or agreement with the critique in any condition. Within the condition with both groups criticizing both groups, there was a trend for those excluded to be less supportive of a one-state solution, $p = .164$. Within the condition where the ingroup criticizes both groups, there was a trend for participants who were excluded to be less agreeing with the critique, $p = .189$, and less supportive of a one-state solution, $p = .129$. Also within the condition where the ingroup criticizes the ingroup, those who were excluded were significantly more supportive of a two-state solution, $p = .038$, and there was a trend for those excluded to be more supportive of a one-state solution. Within the condition where only the ingroup criticizes the ingroup, those who were excluded were significantly more supportive of a two-state solution, $p = .038$.

who the organization was critical of (Israel and Israeli policies and groups or Palestinians and Palestinian groups) was included directly following the manipulation, and used as a check of whether the manipulation affected perceived target of criticism successfully.

Criticism of the ingroup and outgroup. An exploratory principal components analysis with oblique rotation showed that seven items involving ingroup criticism (e.g., *criticizing the policies and actions of Israel, criticizing the Israeli government, criticizing the terror perpetrated by Israelis*; loadings .67-.94) formed a distinct factor from four items revolving around outgroup criticism (e.g., *criticizing the policies and actions of Palestinians, criticizing the Palestinian organizations who use violence against Israel, criticizing terrorism committed by Palestinians*; loadings .61-.94). Both the 7-item measure of ingroup criticism ($M = 6.79$, $SD = 1.68$, $\alpha = .92$) and the 4-item measure of outgroup criticism ($M = 3.76$, $SD = 2.04$, $\alpha = .88$) formed reliable scales.

Results of check for perceived criticism. To check whether the manipulation for target of criticism was effective, a GLM tested main effects of group composition and target of criticism on the two measures assessing participants' perceptions of Israel as the target of criticism and of Palestinians as the target of criticism. As expected, framing both groups ($M = 4.27$, $SD = 2.05$) rather than just the ingroup ($M = 3.24$, $SD = 1.90$) as the target of criticism significantly increased the perception that the organization is critical of Palestinians, $F(2, 229) = 15.76$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .064$. Framing the organization as critical of both groups ($M = 6.46$, $SD = 1.59$) rather than just the ingroup ($M = 7.15$, $SD = 1.61$) also reduced the extent to which participants perceived the organization as critical of Israel, $F(2, 229) = 10.25$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .043$. Surprisingly, both groups working together ($M = 6.96$, $SD = 1.59$) rather than just the ingroup working alone ($M = 6.56$, $SD = 1.79$)

marginally increased the perception that the organization is critical of Israel, $F(2, 229) = 3.12, p = .067, \eta_p^2 = .015$; both groups working together ($M = 3.57, SD = 2.01$), rather than just the ingroup working alone ($M = 4.04, SD = 2.06$) marginally decreased the perception that the organization is critical of Palestinians, $F(2, 229) = 3.12, p = .079, \eta_p^2 = .013$.

Measures

Study 3 included the same measures used in Study 2 to assess anger ($M = 5.35, SD = 2.36, \alpha = .95$), hope ($M = 3.33, SD = 2.48$), support for having the organization present ($M = 3.95, SD = 2.61$), and agreement with the critique of the organization ($M = 6.28, SD = 2.31$). Study 3 also included the same measures as Study 2 to assess support for political solutions, including support for a one-state solution with Palestinian enclaves ($M = 4.13, SD = 2.42$) and support for a two-state solution ($M = 2.72, SD = 2.29$), and support for negotiations with Palestinians ($M = 4.67, SD = 2.33$).

Glorification ($M = 5.76, SD = 1.64, \alpha = .84$) and *attachment* ($M = 7.44, SD = 1.51, \alpha = .89$). To assess whether glorification moderated either how the group composition, target of criticism, or the interaction between the two affected outcomes, eight items assessed participants' glorification and, in a separate block, seven items assessed participants' attachment (one of eight items excluded based on cross-loading). These items were included after assessing all other measures of primary interest. As in Studies 1-2, attachment was used as a covariate in all analyses with glorification.

Support for allowing the organization to present ($M = 3.95, SD = 2.61$). In response to the scenario describing local governments' intention to use participants' input

as part of their decision, a single item measured participants' support for allowing the organization to present ranging from 1 ("Strongly Oppose") to 9 ("Strongly Support").

Study 3 Results

Before conducting main analyses, a GLM model with group composition and target of criticism as independent variables tested whether glorification and attachment (moderator and covariate, respectively) were affected by condition; neither were affected by either condition, $ps > .500$. GLM models tested group composition, target of criticism, glorification, and their interactions as predictors for each outcome. Glorification and attachment were each standardized so that the mean was zero, and a value of '1' indicated those participants with scores one standard deviation above mean, and a value of '-1' indicated those participants with scores one standard deviation below the mean. Thus, "high glorifiers" refers to those one standard deviation above the mean on glorification, whereas "low glorifiers" refers to those one standard deviation below the mean on glorification.

Interactions were decomposed examining glorification as an independent variable predicting mediators and outcomes differentially across conditions; in the figures that follow, significant slopes ($p < .05$) are indicated with an asterisk, and marginal slopes ($p \leq .10$) are indicated with a plus sign. In addition, contrasts between conditions among low glorifiers and between conditions among high glorifiers are noted in graphs of three-way interactions when the p -value of the contrasts is .15 or lower. Three-way interactions were decomposed using Hayes' Process Model 3 (2013).

Anger


Group composition did not significantly affect anger as a main effect, $F(1, 223) = 0.00, p = .984, \eta_p^2 = .000$. However, target of criticism $F(8, 223) = 4.97, p = .027, \eta_p^2 = .022$ did affect anger. Anger was higher when the ingroup was the only target of criticism ($M = 5.70, SD = 2.40$) rather than when both groups were the target of criticism, ($M = 5.01, SD = 2.27$). The two-way interaction between group composition and target of criticism was not significant, $F(1, 223) = .29, p = .593, \eta_p^2 = .001$.

Glorification significantly predicted higher levels of anger, $b = .75, SE = .18, t(223) = 4.26, p < .001$, whereas attachment did not significantly predict anger, $b = .16, SE = .17, t(223) = .93, p = .351$. Moreover, glorification significantly interacted with group composition $F(8, 223) = 4.98, p = .027, \eta_p^2 = .022$; glorification predicted significantly more anger when both groups were working together, $b = 1.08, SE = .20, t(223) = 5.29, p < .001$, but only marginally when the ingroup was working alone, $b = .43, SE = .25, t(223) = 1.70, p = .091$. Likewise, glorification significantly interacted with target of criticism, $F(1, 223) = 5.63, p = .019, \eta_p^2 = .025$; glorification predicted significantly more anger when the target of criticism was just the ingroup, $b = 1.10, SE = .22, t(223) = 5.00, p < .001$, but only marginally when the target of criticism was both groups, $b = .41, SE = .24, t(223) = 1.71, p = .089$.

A significant three-way interaction between group composition, target of criticism, and glorification qualified these two-way interactions, $F(8, 223) = 4.39, p = .037, \eta_p^2 = .019$. The two-way interaction between glorification and group composition was significant when both groups were the target of criticism, $b = 1.26, SE = .44, t(223) = 2.88, p = .004$, but not when the target of criticism was only the ingroup, $b = .04, SE = .38, t(223) = .099, p = .922$. As Figure 2 shows, glorification predicted significantly

higher levels of anger when the ingroup is working alone and criticizes only the ingroup, $b = 1.08$, $SE = .31$, $t(223) = 3.31$, $p = .001$, when both groups are working together and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = 1.12$, $SE = .27$, $t(223) = 4.09$, $p < .001$. At the same time, glorification predicted significantly higher levels of anger when both groups are working together and criticizing both groups, $b = 1.04$, $SE = .26$, $t(223) = 3.93$, $p < .001$, but not when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing both groups, $b = -.23$, $SE = .37$, $t(223) = -.60$, $p = .547$.⁶

Figure 2. Glorification predicting anger across conditions of group composition and target of criticism.



⁶ The three-way interaction is not significant when not excluding participants based on the group composition attention check, $p = .237$.


Hope. Neither group composition, $F(1, 223) = 1.59, p = .208, \eta_p^2 = .007$, nor target of criticism $F(1, 223) = 2.19, p = .140, \eta_p^2 = .010$, significantly predicted hope as main effects.

Glorification did not significantly predict hope, $b = -.24, SE = .19, t(223) = -1.22, p = .223$, whereas attachment did predict significantly less hope $b = -.41, SE = .19, t(223) = -.41, SE = .19, t(223) = -2.13, p = .034$. However, the two-way interaction between glorification and group composition, $F(1, 223) = 6.55, p = .011, \eta_p^2 = .029$ was significant. With both groups working together, glorification significantly predicted less hope, $b = -.65, SE = .22, t(223) = -2.89, p = .004$. However, when the ingroup was working alone, glorification did not significantly predict hope, $b = .17, SE = .28, t(223) = .63, p = .532$. Additionally, the interaction between glorification and target of criticism was also significant, $F(1, 223) = 10.31, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .044$. When both groups were the target of criticism, glorification did not significantly predict hope, $b = .28, SE = .26, t(223) = 1.06, p = .288$. In contrast, when the target of criticism was only the ingroup, glorification predicted significantly less hope, $b = -.75, SE = .24, t(223) = -3.11, p = .002$.

Moreover, the three-way interaction between glorification, group composition, and target of criticism qualified these two-way interactions to predict hope, $F(1, 223) = 4.52, p = .035, \eta_p^2 = .020$. The interaction between glorification and group composition was significant when both groups were the target of criticism, $b = -1.50, SE = .48, t(223) = -3.12, p = .002$, but not when the target of criticism was only the ingroup, $b = -.14, SE = .42, t(223) = -.32, p = .746$. As Figure 3 shows, glorification significantly predicted less

hope when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = -.68$, $SE = .34$, $t(223) p = .046$, and when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = -.82$, $SE = .30$, $t(223) = -2.73$, $p = .007$. However, glorification predicted higher levels of hope when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, $b = 1.03$, $SE = .41$, $t(223) = 2.51$, $p = .013$, while glorification was not a significant predictor of hope when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, $b = -.47$, $SE = .29$, $t(223) = -1.63$, $p = .104$.⁷

Figure 3. Glorification predicting hope across conditions of group composition and target of criticism.



⁷ The three-way interaction became a trend when not excluding participants based on the group composition attention check, $p = .101$.

Support for the Organization

Neither group composition, $F(8, 223) = .69, p = .408, \eta_p^2 = .003$, nor target of criticism, $F(8, 223) = .72, p = .399, \eta_p^2 = .003$, significantly predicted support as main effects. The two-way interaction between group composition and target of criticism was also not significant, $F(8, 223) = .01, p = .920, \eta_p^2 = .000$.


Glorification significantly predicted less support for having the organization speak, $b = -1.03, SE = .20, t(223) = -5.25, p < .001$, whereas attachment did not predict support for having the organization speak, $b = .03, SE = .19, t(223) = .14, p = .892$. The two-way interaction between glorification and group composition was not significant, $F(1, 223) = 2.23, p = .137, \eta_p^2 = .010$, while the two-way interaction between glorification and target of criticism was marginally significant, $F(1, 223) = 3.55, p = .061, \eta_p^2 = .016$. Glorification predicted less support most strongly when only the ingroup was the target of criticism, $b = -1.34, SE = .25, t(223) = 5.46, p < .001$; glorification also predicted less support when both groups were the target of criticism, but somewhat less strongly, $b = -.73, SE = .27, t(223) = -2.74, p = .007$.

These results were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between glorification, target of criticism, and group composition, $F(1, 223) = 4.80, p = .030, \eta_p^2 = .021$.⁸ As Figure 4 shows, glorification significantly predicts less support when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = -1.45, SE = .35, t(223) = -4.20, p < .001$, and when both groups are working together and criticizing just the

⁸ The three-way interaction became marginal when not excluding participants based on the group composition attention check, $p = .058$.

ingroup, $b = -1.23$, $SE = .30$, $t(223) = -4.02$, $p < .001$. Glorification also predicts less support when both groups are working together and criticizing both groups, $b = -1.33$, $SE = .29$, $t(223) = -4.51$, $p < .001$, but not when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing both groups, $b = -.13$, $SE = .42$, $t(223) = -.30$, $p = .761$.

Figure 4. Glorification predicting support for organization presenting across conditions group composition and target of criticism.




Agreement with Critique of the Organization

Neither group composition, nor target of criticism significantly affected agreement with the critique as main effects, $ps > .500$. Glorification significantly

predicted higher levels of agreement with the critique, $b = .52$, $SE = .18$, $t(223) = 2.85$, $p = .005$, and $b = .34$, $SE = .18$, $t(223) = 1.90$, $p = .059$, respectively. None of the two-way interactions were significant, $ps > .500$. However, there was a significant three-way interaction between glorification, target of criticism, and group composition, $F(1, 223) = 5.38$, $p = .021$, $\eta_p^2 = .024$.⁹ The two-way interaction between group composition and glorification is significant when only the ingroup is the target of criticism, $b = -.84$, $SE = .40$, $t(223) = -2.09$, $p = .038$, but not when both groups are the target of criticism, $b = .58$, $SE = .46$, $t(223) = 1.26$, $p = .210$. As Figure 5 shows, glorification significantly predicts more agreement with the critique when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = .95$, $SE = .32$, $t(223) = 2.93$, $p = .004$, or when both groups work together and are criticizing both groups, $b = .81$, $SE = .28$, $t(223) = 2.94$, $p = .004$, but is not significant when both groups work together and criticize only the ingroup, $b = .11$, $SE = .28$, $t(223) = .38$, $p = .708$. Consistent with the model predicting anger and support for the organization presenting, glorification is not a significant predictor when the ingroup works alone and criticizes both groups, $b = .24$, $SE = .39$, $t(223) = .60$, $p = .547$.

⁹ The three-way interaction became marginal when not excluding participants based on the group composition attention check, $p = .058$.

Figure 5. Glorification predicting agreement with critique across levels of group composition and target of criticism.



Support for Political Solutions


Support for a two-state solution. Neither group composition nor target of criticism affected support for a two-state solution, $ps > .300$. Glorification significantly predicted less support, $b = -.88$, $SE = .17$, $t(223) = -5.07$, $p < .001$, while attachment did not significantly predict support, $b = -.25$, $SE = .17$, $t(223) = -1.46$, $p = .147$. None of the two-way or three-way interactions were significant, $ps > .500$.

Support for a one-state solution. Group composition did not predict support for a one-state solution, $F(1, 223) = .26$, $p = .213$. However, framing the target of criticism as both groups ($M = 4.23$, $SD = 2.51$), rather than just the ingroup ($M = 3.99$, $SD = 2.28$) increased support for a one-state solution, $F(1, 223) = 3.99$, $p = .047$, $\eta_p^2 = .018$. Glorification significantly predicted more support, $b = .64$, $SE = .20$, $t(223) = 3.21$, $p = .002$; attachment did not predict support, $b = -.10$, $SE = .20$, $t(223) = -.51$, $p = .609$. There was a trend towards a two-way interaction between glorification and group composition, $F(1, 223) = 2.61$, $p = .108$, $\eta_p^2 = .012$. None of the other two-way or three-way interactions were significant, $ps > .500$.

Support for negotiations with Palestinians. Neither the main effect of group composition nor the main effect of target of criticism significantly affected support for negotiations, $ps > .130$. Glorification significantly predicted less support for negotiations, $b = -.65$, $SE = .19$, $t(223) = -3.50$, $p < .001$, whereas attachment did not predict support for negotiations, $b = -.07$, $SE = .18$, $t(223) = -.36$, $p = .721$. None of the two-way interactions were significant, $ps > .300$. However, the three-way interaction between

glorification, target of criticism, and group composition was significant, $F(1, 223) = 4.29$, $p = .040$, $\eta_p^2 = .019$. The two-way interaction between glorification and group composition becomes significant when both groups are the target of criticism, $b = -.93$, $SE = .46$, $t(223) = -2.01$, $p = .045$, but is not significant when just the ingroup is the target of criticism, $b = .34$, $SE = .41$, $t(223) = .847$, $p = .398$. As Figure 6 shows, glorification significantly predicts less support for negotiations when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = -.86$, $SE = .33$, $t(223) = -2.64$, $p = .009$, and when both groups are working together and criticizing both groups, $b = -1.08$, $SE = .28$, $t(223) = -3.88$, $p < .001$. However, when both groups are working together and criticizing only the ingroup, glorification marginally predicts support for negotiations, $b = -.52$, $SE = .29$, $t(223) = -1.80$, $p = .073$, and glorification does not significantly predict support for negotiations when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing both groups, $b = -.15$, $SE = .39$, $t(223) = -.37$, $p = .709$.

Figure 6. Glorification predicting support for negotiations across conditions.



Moderated Mediation Analyses

For each dependent variable whereby group composition, target of criticism, and glorification significantly interacted, moderated mediation analyses tested whether

glorification predicted outcomes differentially across conditions because of glorification's differential effects on anger and hope across conditions. Model 12 of Hayes's (2013) Process with 95% confidence intervals and 5,000 bootstrapping samples tested the hypothesis that differences in levels of hope and anger among low and high glorifiers explained the interactions between group composition and target of criticism in predicting (a) support for having the organization speak (b) agreement with the critique and (c) support for negotiations. For each of these outcomes, glorification was treated as the independent variable, with group composition as the first moderator (coding the ingroup as '0' and both groups working together as '1'), and target as the second the moderator (coding the ingroup as '0' and both as '1'). As in all GLM analyses, attachment was included as a covariate.

Predicting support for having the organization speak. The moderated indirect effect of the three-way interaction was significant via both anger (indirect effect of highest order interaction), $b = -.53$, $boot\ SE = .29$, [LLCI: -1.1635, ULCI: -.0363] and hope (indirect effect of highest order interaction), $b = -.50$, $boot\ SE = .25$, [LLCI: -1.0804, ULCI: -.0771]. Glorification decreased support indirectly via (increasing) anger when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = -.44$, $boot\ SE = .15$, [LLCI: -.7861, ULCI: -.2014], when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = -.46$, $SE = .15$, [LLCI: -.8274, ULCI: -.2156], and when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, $b = -.43$, $boot\ SE = .14$, [LLCI: -.7311, ULCI: -.1963], but it was not significant when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, $b = .09$, $boot\ SE = .17$, [LLCI: -.2692, ULCI: .3908].

The indirect effect via hope was likewise significant when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = -.27$, $boot\ SE = .15$, [LLCI: $-.6149$, ULCI: $-.0232$], when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = -.32$, $boot\ SE = .13$, [LLCI: $-.6234$, ULCI: $-.1109$]. The indirect effect via hope was not significant when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, $b = -.18$, $boot\ SE = .12$, [LLCI: $-.4544$, ULCI: $.0380$], and it was significant in the opposite direction when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, $b = .40$, $boot\ SE = .21$, [LLCI: $.0082$, ULCI: $.8211$].

Predicting agreement with the critique. The moderated indirect effect of the three-way interaction was significant via both anger, (indirect effect of highest order interaction) $b = .50$, $boot\ SE = .24$, [LLCI: $.0527$, ULCI: 1.0092] and hope, (indirect effect of highest order interaction) $b = .37$, $boot\ SE = .21$, [LLCI: $.0134$, ULCI: $.8217$]. Glorification increased agreement indirectly via (increased) anger when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = .44$, $boot\ SE = .13$, [LLCI: $.2051$, ULCI: $.7114$], when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = .45$, $boot\ SE = .13$, [LLCI: $.2245$, ULCI: $.7370$], and when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, $b = .42$, $boot\ SE = .12$, [LLCI: $.2069$, ULCI: $.6839$]. This indirect effect was not significant, however, when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, $b = -.09$, $boot\ SE = .16$, [LLCI: $-.3840$, ULCI: $.2558$].

The indirect effect via hope was significant when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = .18$, $boot\ SE = .10$, [LLCI: $.0130$, ULCI: $.4278$], when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = .22$, $boot\ SE = .09$, [LLCI: $.0806$, ULCI: $.4291$]. The indirect effect via hope was not significant

when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, $b = .13$, $boot\ SE = .08$, [LLCI: $-.0161$, ULCI: $.3165$], and it was significant in the opposite direction when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, $b = -.28$, $boot\ SE = .15$, [LLCI: $-.5967$, ULCI: $-.0163$].

Predicting support for negotiations with Palestinians. The indirect effect of the three-way interaction on support for negotiations via anger was significant, (indirect effect of highest order interaction) $b = -.44$, $boot\ SE = .22$, [LLCI: $-.9643$, ULCI: $-.0730$], yet the indirect effect via hope was not (indirect effect of highest order interaction), $b = -.15$, $boot\ SE = .15$, [LLCI: $-.6062$, ULCI: $.0251$]. Glorification predicted support for negotiations by increasing anger when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = -.39$, $boot\ SE = .13$, [LLCI: $-.7134$, ULCI: $-.1646$], when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, $b = -.40$, $boot\ SE = .13$, [LLCI: $-.7162$, ULCI: $-.1822$], and when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, $b = -.37$, $boot\ SE = .12$, [LLCI: $-.6417$, ULCI: $-.1681$], but not when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, $b = .08$, $boot\ SE = .15$, [LLCI: $-.2203$, ULCI: $.3731$].

Study 3 Discussion

Study 3 tested how the group composition of a peace activist organization and the perceived target of its criticism might predict support for the organization and its activities, and how glorification is likely to moderate these effects. Study 3 demonstrated that support for the activist organization depended not only on its composition and perceived target(s) of its criticism, but on how much participants glorified the ingroup. Glorification becomes especially (positively) predictive of anger and (negatively) hope

when both groups are working together, and when the ingroup is the only target of criticism. In the cases of both anger and hope, spreading criticism to both groups attenuates the impact of glorification. When the ingroup is working alone to criticize both groups, the relationship between glorification and hope reverses, such that higher levels of glorification predict more hope. The outcome of support for the organization presenting follows a different but similar pattern; across conditions glorification predicts less support, except for when the ingroup is working alone to criticize both groups. Agreement with the critique and support for negotiations with Palestinians both follow different but similar patterns; glorification is less predictive when the ingroup is working alone to criticize both groups.

Linking research on rejection of ingroup members of join outgroups (Travaglino et al., 2014) to research on glorification, this demonstrates that those who strongly glorify the ingroup are especially sensitive to ingroup members working with outgroup members. Connecting this to research on the role of glorification in shaping how people protect the ingroup's moral image (e.g., Leidner et al., 2010) and research on sensitivity to criticism of the ingroup (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2002), this research shows that glorifiers react most negatively when both groups work together to criticize just the ingroup. However, it also shows that that critiquing the outgroup in addition can attenuate the negative reactions of those who strongly glorify the ingroup.

Beyond direct effects, Study 3 also showed support for the hypothesis that anger and hope (see Halperin & Pilskin, 2015) would mediate the interactive relationships between glorification, group composition, and target of criticism. Glorification decreased support for allowing the organization to present when both groups were working together

or when the ingroup was working alone and critiquing the ingroup by increasing anger and decreasing hope. Likewise, glorification predicted stronger agreement with the critique of the organization when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups or when the ingroup was criticizing only the ingroup, and it did so by increasing anger and decreasing hope (or increasing hope in the case of the ingroup working alone and criticizing both groups, although this finding should be taken with caution without a significant direct effect of glorification in that condition). Glorification decreased support for negotiations by increasing anger when both groups were working together; it increased agreement with the critique when the ingroup was working alone to critique just the ingroup by increasing anger.

At the same time, and consistent with Studies 1-2, Study 3 did not significantly impact support for specific political solutions to end the conflict. Thus, whereas the group composition of an activist organization and the way it targets its criticism may shape people's openness to peace activists having an opportunity to voice their views, and may even affect openness to negotiations with Palestinians, these factors seem unlikely to affect people's support for specific solutions, such as a one-state solution or a two-state solution.

These patterns highlight the importance of people's preconceived beliefs in the conflict (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Slight differences in the framing of a manipulation are unlikely to change people's preconceived support for peace activism or support for specific solutions to end the conflict, but they may alter the way in which other psychological factors, such as glorification (Roccas et al., 2008), shape their support. This may explain why group composition and target of criticism do not interact

independent of glorification; rather, the way in which they interact depends upon how strongly participants glorify the ingroup.¹⁰

It is also possible that people's preconceived beliefs in the conflict may inform their responses to critiques of the activist organization. Even though people high in glorification tended to be more likely to agree with critiques of the organization, it is possible that those who do not strongly glorify the ingroup agree with the critiques for a variety of reasons. For example, they may perceive the organization as having naïve perceptions of possible solutions to the conflict because of how other members of the ingroup will receive them, expecting other ingroup members to react adversely.

¹⁰ Additionally, inspection of the means from Study 3 using a mixed ANOVA (with group composition, target of criticism, and their interaction testing the difference between perceptions of the organization as critical of Israel and as critical of Palestinians as repeated measures) suggest that, across conditions, participants generally perceived that the organization was more critical of Israel than of Palestinians, $F(1, 228) = 191.52, p < .001$, suggesting that although the manipulation stating that the organization was critical of both groups increased participants' beliefs that the organization was critical of Palestinians, participants still generally perceived the organization as most critical of Israel. This may reflect participants' motivation to be sensitive to criticism of their ingroup, which becomes especially important in contexts of protracted conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2012).

CHAPTER 5

GENERAL DISCUSSION

This dissertation research shows that glorification predicts negative responses to activism to end intergroup conflict, and in particular when it takes the form of intergroup solidarity, where both groups are working together. Study 3 showed direct evidence that glorification moderates how people react to intergroup solidarity, and also showed evidence that having both groups criticize both groups may attenuate the relationship between glorification and outcomes reflecting support for an activist organization.

Taken together, these findings address the need for research on the psychological factors that impact whether people react with support or backlash to peace activism (Louis, 2009). It does so in a context of protracted conflict whereby people are especially prone to cling to an image of their group as moral and unified (Bar-Tal et al., 2012). The findings of Study 3 in particular have important implications for theory and spur new directions for future research.

This research shows evidence that whether people support or react with backlash to intergroup solidarity in activism to end intractable conflict is dependent on at least three factors: how they identify with the ingroup (e.g., Roccas et al., 2008) whether the activist organization includes members of both groups working together or just the ingroup working alone; and how the organization directs its criticism. As such, these findings contribute to theory on indirect exposure to outgroups (e.g., Leshem et al., 2016; O'Brien et al., in press; Saguy & Halperin, 2014), defensiveness against criticism of the ingroup (Ariyanto et al., 2010; Hornsey et al., 2002), emotions in protracted conflict

(Halperin & Pilskin, 2015), and distinct modes of social identification (Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006; 2008).

In particular, this dissertation research shows that the extent to which people view their ingroup as superior and revere deference to its norms (e.g., glorification) predicts aversive reactions towards activist organizations working to resolve conflict with the outgroup. This finding itself is not surprising, because peace activists are expressly defying the ingroup's norms and authorities, and at least implying that the ingroup has erred. However, as Study 3 shows, those who glorify their ingroup strongly are particularly sensitive to members of their ingroup working with the outgroup. This links research on glorification (Roccas et al., 2008) with research showing that group members reject deviants (Hutchison & Abrams, 2003; Schacter, 1951), especially those who strongly identify with the ingroup (Hutchison & Abrams, 2003), and especially when those deviants leave the ingroup to join an outgroup with whom they are in competition (Travaglino et al., 2014), demonstrating that specifically glorification rather than ingroup identification generally (e.g., Hutchison & Abrams, 2003) predicts more negative reactions to those defying group norms by working with an outgroup.

The findings from Study 3 also raise important questions regarding those who do not glorify their ingroup strongly. These findings suggest that those who do not strongly glorify their ingroup are those who are most likely to react positively to intergroup solidarity. However, in contrast to findings on sensitivity to criticism of the ingroup (e.g., Ariyanto et al., 2010), low glorifiers may actually react negatively to ingroup members who criticize the outgroup, rather than simply responding negatively to outgroup members who criticize the ingroup. Their responses towards an activist organization of

just their ingroup members criticizing just the ingroup were more positive than their responses towards an activist organization of ingroup members criticizing both the ingroup and the outgroup. Whereas high glorifiers are generally defensive against threats to the ingroup's moral image (e.g., Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006), this could suggest that low glorifiers may even want their ingroup to take responsibility for conflict, or at least express concern about the outgroup receiving criticism. Future research should test mechanisms explaining why those who do not strongly glorify their ingroup react more positively on certain outcomes to the ingroup being the only target of criticism.

As in Study 2, the rate of participants who did not pass attention checks in Study 3 also point to important insights for future studies in this program of research. Of particular concern was the rate of participants who did not pass the attention check regarding the target of criticism. Supplementary analyses indicate that whereas participants who did not pass this attention check and the attention check on group composition administered at the end of the study were significantly lower on attachment than those who did pass, even excluding those participants who did not pass the group composition attention check, those who did not pass the target of criticism were still marginally lower on attachment. People who were low on attachment may also have been less engaged in this study, and thus tired towards the end. This could explain why so many people did not pass this attention check regarding target of criticism. However, the continuous measure of perceived criticism shows evidence that this manipulation generally increased perceptions of the organization as critical of the outgroup. In future research to prepare for publication, I am considering a study to replicate the two-way interactions between group composition and glorification, adding measures to build upon

these findings of Study 3 and also address the study's methodological limitations. For example, although I would not add the same attention check used in the current research to directly follow the manipulation, adding a continuous measure of perceptions of group composition, similar to the continuous measure of perceived criticism, could indicate whether the manipulation was effective without making clear the study purpose. In Study 1, the rate of participants who did not pass the attention check were not particularly high except in the outgroup condition. In Study 2, they were high in the outgroup and ingroup conditions, but since there was generally a low number of participants in this study, there was reason to suspect that the rate of participants who did not pass would decrease.

Although each of these studies improved upon the prior in some way, methodological flaws may point to the strength of the context and participants' prior experiences. Asking participants to "imagine" a peace activist is not strong enough to impact their reactions to those peace activist organizations. In hindsight, and partly based on the attention check, the outgroup condition likely left many participants confused in Study 2, and so this condition was eliminated for subsequent studies. In Study 3, regardless of whether it was explicitly stated that the organization was critical of both Israeli and Palestinian policies and actions, participants perceive that the organization is more critical of Israel than of Palestinians, perhaps reflecting a general tendency to be sensitive to criticism of the ingroup in contexts of protracted conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 2012).

This could point to a direction for future research. For example, whereas past research shows that representations of groups as belonging to one inclusive group can lead to more favorable representations of formerly outgroup members (e.g., Gaertner,

Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994), and that group members have more negative evaluations of former ingroup members who leave the ingroup to join an outgroup (Travaglino et al., 2014), representations of ingroup members working with outgroup members could lead to perceptions of ingroup members as belonging to the outgroup. This could depend on glorification, whereby those who strongly glorify the ingroup and are thus sensitive to the defiance of norms recategorize ingroup members working with the outgroup as outgroup members and evaluate them more negatively.

Future research should also address how those high and low in glorification react differentially to criticism. For example, whereas past research has shown that people evaluate ingroup members criticizing the ingroup more positively than outgroup members because they perceive critics from the ingroup as constructive (Hornsey, Trembath, & Gunthorpe, 2004), how people perceive the consequences of criticism could depend on their levels of glorification (Roccas et al., 2008). Those who do not strongly glorify the ingroup may perceive criticism as constructive, whereas those who strongly glorify the ingroup perceive criticism as damaging to the ingroup.

Conclusion

This dissertation integrates theory on distinct modes of social identity (Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2008) with research on deviance of group norms (Schacter, 1951; Travaglino et al., 2014) and exposure to group-based criticism from ingroup and outgroup members during conflict (Ariyanto et al., 2010; Saguy & Halperin, 2014). It shows that, in a context of protracted conflict, high glorifiers in particular are sensitive to learning about activism to advocate ending the conflict, particularly to members of their ingroup working with an outgroup, and particularly when the criticism targets exclusively

their ingroup. Future research will seek to replicate and extend findings regarding the differential effects of both groups working together among those who strongly glorify their ingroup vs. those who do not, as well as the reduction of backlash among those who glorify their ingroup when only ingroup members are involved and both groups are the target of criticism.

APPENDIX: MEASURES

Support for political solutions

A two-state solution based on the pre-1967 lines, with all settlements in the West Bank evacuated to the pre-1967 lines and Jerusalem divided (solution reflecting the most compromise)

A one-state solution, in which Israel remains a Jewish state with Palestinian enclaves (solution involving least compromise to the ingroup).

Glorification (Full Scale from Study 1):

On the next page, please report your opinion on the role of Israel in the world.

Remember, there are no right or wrong answers.

Other nations can learn a lot from us.

In today's world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation.

The IDF is the best army in the world.

One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our nation.

Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation.

It is disloyal for Israelis to criticize Israel.

Israel is better than other nations in all respects.

There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national authorities.

Attachment (Full Scale from Study 1):

On the next page, we are interested in how you perceive yourself as an Israeli citizen.

Again, there are no right or wrong answers.

I love Israel.

Being an Israeli is an important part of my identity.

It is important to me to contribute to my nation.

It is important to me to view myself as an Israeli.

I am strongly committed to my nation.

It is important to me that everyone will see me as an Israeli.

It is important for me to serve my country.

When I talk about Israelis I usually say “we” rather than “they.”

Emotions towards organization in Studies 2-3

In the next set of questions we would like to ask you about the emotions you feel when thinking about (Israelis working for a Solution/Israelis and Palestinians working for a solution). To do so please move the slider below anywhere between “Not at all” and “Absolutely”. When thinking about (name of organization) I feel...¹¹

...angry

...irritated

...hopeful

...annoyed

...irate

¹¹ Other emotions, including several items assessing fear, and one item meant to be used as a reverse for “hope” were also measured.

...betrayed

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